ds

.tatar

Generic top-level domain

RDAP + WHOISPlaces

Register
—first year
Renew
—a year
Transfer
—to move it
Registrars
—quoting it
Lookup
RDAP + WHOISanswers for it
DNSSEC
Signed1 DS record in the root
Level
Secondmybrand.tatar

Check a name

One command, straight against the registry — no account, no page to load.

Fills the command and the registrar links below in with your own name. The page is static — nothing is looked up here, and nothing you type leaves the browser.

ds mybrand --tld tatar

Add --where for the registrars and the registry's rules, --registry for the server that answered, or --all-info for everything at once.

What it costs

No registrar in the price table bundled with ds quotes .tatar, so the CLI prints no figure beside it — one of 927 such TLDs. That is a gap in the table as often as it is a TLD nobody sells. See Prices for supplying your own table with --pricing-file.

Who can register

No eligibility rule is on file for .tatar, which is not the same as a promise that it is open: the list is hand-maintained and covers the restricted TLDs a registrar is likely to offer you. Check the registry's own page before counting on a name. 81 TLDs do carry a rule — see Who can register.

How ds answers for it

RDAP first, WHOIS second — the same order for every TLD. .tatar has both, so RDAP answers and WHOIS is the fallback if it does not.

RDAP
https://whois.nic.tatar/rdapFrom IANA's bootstrap, refreshed when this page was built. The lookup is https://whois.nic.tatar/rdap/domain/mybrand.tatar — a 404 means the name is free.
WHOIS
whois.nic.tatarQueried on port 43, from the bundled whois.json. The name is called free when the reply contains the queried object does not exist — text matching, which is why RDAP is preferred where it exists.

ds mybrand --tld tatar --registry prints whichever of these answered. If a bundled WHOIS host has gone stale, IANA is asked who serves .tatar today. See Accuracy notes.

The registry

From IANA's delegation record for .tatar. .tatar is a generic TLD.

Run by
Limited Liability Company "Coordination Center of Regional Domain of Tatarstan Republic"Based in Russian Federation. Delegated 2014-07-03, record last updated 2026-08-21.
Registry site
www.dottatar.ruWhere the registry documents .tatar — its rules, its accredited registrars, and any launch phases. Not a shop: registries sell wholesale to registrars, not to you.
Published services
whois.nic.tatar · whois.nic.tatarWhat the registry itself tells IANA it runs. They agree with what ds asks.
Name servers
a.dns.ripn.netb.dns.ripn.netc.tld-servers.rud.dns.ripn.nete.dns.ripn.netf.dns.ripn.netThe 6 authoritative servers for the .tatar zone — what the root delegates to. Nothing ds queries directly; they are what makes a registered name resolve.

What it is

Derived from the root zone and ICANN's registry list — each one is a fact with a source.

  • generic IANA Root Zone Database types it "generic"
  • new-gtld ICANN delegated it on or after 2013-10-23, when the 2013 round opened — see delegated

What it is for

Our reading, not a fact — nothing in the root zone says what a TLD means. Hand-maintained in tld-categories.json.

  • Places Cities, regions, and parts of the world.

In the root zone

The delegation itself, read out of the root zone — serial 2026090900, on 2026-09-09. The registry section above is IANA's record of what .tatar was delegated to; this is what the root actually answers with when a resolver asks it where .tatar lives.

Delegated to
  • a.dns.ripn.net193.232.128.62001:678:17:0:193:232:128:6
  • b.dns.ripn.net194.85.252.622001:678:16:0:194:85:252:62
  • c.tld-servers.ru194.190.122.172a09:bd00:1:0:194:190:122:17
  • d.dns.ripn.net194.190.124.172001:678:18:0:194:190:124:17
  • e.dns.ripn.net193.232.142.172001:678:15:0:193:232:142:17
  • f.dns.ripn.net193.232.156.172001:678:14:0:193:232:156:17
The 6 name servers the root hands out for .tatar, with the glue addresses that come with them — every one of them answers over IPv6. None of this is what ds queries: these servers know which names exist, not who registered them.
DNSSEC
Signed — 1 DS record in the root
  • key 64610RSA/SHA-256 · SHA-25615B841D7055112380DB88D9BD6B0B6C0D3B5D5CA091F4FECEED2FD6EB1B2C203
Each one is a fingerprint of .tatar's own signing key, published by the root and signed with the root's key — which is how a resolver that trusts only one key can prove an answer under .tatar came from its registry and was not tampered with in transit. It says nothing about who owns a name or whether one is free.

Ask the root yourself — no registry involved, and the same records this section was built from: dig +norec @a.root-servers.net tatar. NS and dig +norec @a.root-servers.net tatar. DS.