ds

.abudhabi

Generic top-level domain

RDAP + WHOISPlaces

Register
—first year
Renew
—a year
Transfer
—to move it
Registrars
—quoting it
Lookup
RDAP + WHOISanswers for it
DNSSEC
Signed2 DS records in the root
Level
Secondmybrand.abudhabi

Check a name

One command, straight against the registry — no account, no page to load.

Fills the command and the registrar links below in with your own name. The page is static — nothing is looked up here, and nothing you type leaves the browser.

ds mybrand --tld abudhabi

Add --where for the registrars and the registry's rules, --registry for the server that answered, or --all-info for everything at once.

What it costs

No registrar in the price table bundled with ds quotes .abudhabi, so the CLI prints no figure beside it — one of 927 such TLDs. That is a gap in the table as often as it is a TLD nobody sells. See Prices for supplying your own table with --pricing-file.

Who can register

No eligibility rule is on file for .abudhabi, which is not the same as a promise that it is open: the list is hand-maintained and covers the restricted TLDs a registrar is likely to offer you. Check the registry's own page before counting on a name. 81 TLDs do carry a rule — see Who can register.

How ds answers for it

RDAP first, WHOIS second — the same order for every TLD. .abudhabi has both, so RDAP answers and WHOIS is the fallback if it does not.

RDAP
https://rdap.nic.abudhabiFrom IANA's bootstrap, refreshed when this page was built. The lookup is https://rdap.nic.abudhabi/domain/mybrand.abudhabi — a 404 means the name is free.
WHOIS
whois.nic.abudhabiQueried on port 43, from the bundled whois.json. The name is called free when the reply contains no data found — text matching, which is why RDAP is preferred where it exists.

ds mybrand --tld abudhabi --registry prints whichever of these answered. If a bundled WHOIS host has gone stale, IANA is asked who serves .abudhabi today. See Accuracy notes.

The registry

From IANA's delegation record for .abudhabi. .abudhabi is a generic TLD.

Run by
Abu Dhabi Systems and Information CentreBased in United Arab Emirates. Delegated 2016-02-26, record last updated 2019-11-26.
Published services
rdap.nic.abudhabi · whois.nic.abudhabiWhat the registry itself tells IANA it runs. They agree with what ds asks.
Name servers
gtld.alpha.aridns.net.augtld.beta.aridns.net.augtld.delta.aridns.net.augtld.gamma.aridns.net.auThe 4 authoritative servers for the .abudhabi zone — what the root delegates to. Nothing ds queries directly; they are what makes a registered name resolve.

What it is

Derived from the root zone and ICANN's registry list — each one is a fact with a source.

  • generic IANA Root Zone Database types it "generic"
  • new-gtld ICANN delegated it on or after 2013-10-23, when the 2013 round opened — see delegated

What it is for

Our reading, not a fact — nothing in the root zone says what a TLD means. Hand-maintained in tld-categories.json.

  • Places Cities, regions, and parts of the world.

In the root zone

The delegation itself, read out of the root zone — serial 2026090900, on 2026-09-09. The registry section above is IANA's record of what .abudhabi was delegated to; this is what the root actually answers with when a resolver asks it where .abudhabi lives.

Delegated to
  • gtld.beta.aridns.net.au37.209.194.102001:dcd:2::10
  • gtld.alpha.aridns.net.au37.209.192.102001:dcd:1::10
  • gtld.delta.aridns.net.au37.209.198.102001:dcd:4::10
  • gtld.gamma.aridns.net.au37.209.196.102001:dcd:3::10
The 4 name servers the root hands out for .abudhabi, with the glue addresses that come with them — every one of them answers over IPv6. None of this is what ds queries: these servers know which names exist, not who registered them.
DNSSEC
Signed — 2 DS records in the root
  • key 15247RSA/SHA-256 · SHA-1D2C05AD2312EBE77F6149F8B962DD9012D6D2CCA
  • key 15247RSA/SHA-256 · SHA-2564146C35F5EE96A341EE8C8F0ACA17A2CBB52FCD1D6D1C95C9AAB70061A7AC692
Each one is a fingerprint of .abudhabi's own signing key, published by the root and signed with the root's key — which is how a resolver that trusts only one key can prove an answer under .abudhabi came from its registry and was not tampered with in transit. It says nothing about who owns a name or whether one is free.

Ask the root yourself — no registry involved, and the same records this section was built from: dig +norec @a.root-servers.net abudhabi. NS and dig +norec @a.root-servers.net abudhabi. DS.